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Abstract
We investigate the relationship between personality types and the strength of created and
selected passwords. For this purpose, we conducted an experiment on Amazon’s Mechan-
ical Turk, with 510 participants. Participants were given a pre-questionnaire that included,
among others, three binary questions: “Password Awareness”, “Security Training” and
“Account Hijacking”, which were used to predict participants’ exposure to passwords in
the past. Our results suggest that participants with higher levels of Extroversion, tend to
create stronger passwords, if they were not required to change an online account password
in the past (e.g., due to a security incident). In contrast, participants with lower levels of
Extroversion tend to create stronger passwords (though not significantly), if they had been
required to change an online account password in the past. These results indicate that there
is a distinct relationship between the Extroversion personality dimension and the way we
create passwords, whether it be in a familiar situation or not. Though password strength, as
investigated, is the criterion of the aforementioned tests, it is worth mentioning that Extro-
version cannot be deemed a predictor in this domain. We also investigated the relationship
between personality and several password characteristics such as the total length, letters,
digits, and symbols used within a password. To this end, we note that for participants who
have had to change an online account password for the first time, Extroversion was directly
correlated with creating and selecting shorter passwords, Openness was directly correlated
with creating passwords containing fewer letters, but more numbers and symbols, and Con-
i
scientiousness was directly correlated with creating passwords containing fewer symbols.
These results conclude that there is a distinct correlation between the construction of pass-
words and personality when participants are required to change an online account password
for the first time. This thesis presents the detailed observations and findings from our ex-
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Personality, though it has been investigated to influence a plethora of psychological on-
line behaviours, has had a relatively non-existent history in digital authentication research.
The influence of personality traits has been investigated with regard to a plethora of on-
line behaviours, but not much in authentication research. Anecdotally, there are indi-
vidual differences in the way users create passwords for authentication. However, to
what extent (if any), the strength of online passwords is influenced by one’s personal-
ity remains unexplored, despite password research still being very active (see e.g., pass-
word strength [41, 76], password habits [25, 27], and effects of strength meters on pass-
words [71]).
There have been many studies in the psychometric field of personality types, provid-
ing ample evidence that our personality traits significantly influence our interaction with
inanimate objects; see e.g., [16, 39, 44, 57, 75]. Interesting findings in this domain include
correlations between personality and internet usage [44], personality and smartphone us-
age [16], and even personality and personal motivation [3, 39].
Traditionally, passwords have been researched in the strength and guessability domain
[27,41,71,76,77] with an upward trend toward memorability [5,20,66,73,80], which con-
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cludes that users tend to choose easier-to-remember passwords that include names, short
words, dates, and patterns resulting in easier to guess passwords. The general consensus
of most password research is an equilibrium between security and memorability, with a
tradeoff for either. Based on previous experiences, users tend to gravitate toward making
passwords similar to what they are familiar with such as including a number or symbol
in their passwords if told that was the right thing to do in the past. More generally, stud-
ies on password selection, memorability and usability conclude that people choose poor
passwords [1, 9, 58]. Users tend to choose short passwords and derive them from personal
information that is easily guessable, although no solid research attempts were put forth to
investigating personality-based influences on chosen and selected passwords.
We have conducted an online experiment, where 510 participants from across the world
supplied various levels of data including situational-based created passwords and person-
ality profiles. This data collected is discussed in Section 3.1.3.
One particular personality trait - Extroversion - has been linked to patterns of online
behaviour, paving the grounds for the hypotheses in this study. For instance, Chittaranjan
et al. [16] showed that Extroversion is negatively correlated with the amount of internet
usage, which was further reinforced by Landers et al. [46] yielding the same result. Krämer
et al. [44] found that extroverts were more willing to be experimental and try something
completely different in a new situation.
Hypotheses. Based on the above studies, we put forward the following hypotheses:
1. When answering “No” to “Account Hijacking”1, those who demonstrate a higher
level of Extroversion are more likely to create a stronger password.
2. When answering “Yes” to “Account Hijacking”, those who demonstrate a lower level
of Extroversion are more likely to create a stronger password.
1“Account Hijacking” is a binary question asked to participants to determine whether they have ever had
to change a password for an online account in the past as a result of a security breach.
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The primary contribution of this research is the exploration of relationship between
user’s psychological traits and their password choices. We have conducted an online ex-
periment, where 510 participants from across the world provided (through Amazon Me-
chanical Turk) situational-based created/selected passwords, as well as responses related to
their personality profiles. Our major findings include: extroverts tended to create stronger
passwords if they were not required to change their passwords due to a previous security
incident (r = 0.184, p = 0.023, N = 154); while introverts tended to create stronger pass-
words (though not significantly) if they were required to change their passwords due to a
previous security incident (r = -0.099, p = 0.062, N = 356).
Furthermore, we conducted exploratory analyses on the influence of personality traits
on certain password characteristics (e.g., length and character distribution), which yielded
several findings suggesting Extroversion, Openness and Conscientiousness have direct cor-
relations with how participants constructed their passwords. Overall, our work opens the
possibility of improving password security though personalization, by taking certain per-
sonality traits into consideration.
1.1 Motivation
Passwords are the leading form of digital authentication and repeatedly has always been
preferred by users for authentication methods. Although much is known about passwords
and what constitutes to a memorable and strong one, very little is known about its rela-
tionship with our psychological profile. This is of huge interest as discoveries in this area
could open various doors of understanding such as how psychological state affects pass-
word strength, how a certain personality trait may respond to security incidents, whether
specific personnel may be more or less likely to be trusted with sensitive data and so on.
Perhaps one of the more notable possibilities is the integration with trust. If a company
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is able to identify a personality type of an employee with confidential clearance, they may
be more likely to invest in extended security training for said individual should they notice
their personality is more likely to create a weaker password. This could help mitigate risk
for the company and save huge sums of money.
Furthermore, companies and websites may have the opportunity to implement a more
tailored password creation form if they have a password meter specific to the user’s per-
sonality. Of course, this is stipulated on the website knowing the personality type of the
user, but an implication such as this could mean more accurate password creation. Noted
at the weakest point of entry, user password-centric breaches can be reduced. Potential
implications of this research can include helping make systems more secure by addressing
psychological-based security loopholes when considering security designs. For example, if
a company is thinking about implementing certain security standards into their infrastruc-
ture, conducting an experiment such as a fake security breach can help strengthen the way
certain personality types create future passwords for their company account. Whether this
is an ethical solution is up for discussion, the concept remains a thorough example.
1.2 Background
In this section, we provide further background information regarding several items related
to our experiment including: the password meter we used for ranking passwords, a brief
introduction to the Big-five personality traits, and the specific test we used for personality
type determination.
1.2.1 The Zxcvbn Password Strength Measure
Several tools exist for evaluating and ranking the strength of specific passwords. We chose
to use Zxcvbn [77] due to its simplicity and reliability (any decent strength meter can be
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used in its place). Zxcvbn rates a password’s strength on a scale from 0-4:
• 0: too guessable – risky password;
• 1: very guessable – protection from throttled online attacks;
• 2: somewhat guessable – protection from unthrottled online attacks.
• 3: safely unguessable – moderate protection from offline slow-hash scenario.
• 4: very unguessable – strong protection from offline slow-hash scenario.
All the passwords created and obtained within this experiment were run through Zxcvbn
for a standardized strength score, which would remain consistent within the life cycle of
the experiment and analysis.
Along with the score, another field of particular interest generated by Zxcvbn is the
“Offline Slow Hashing” which is Zxcvbn’s simulated offline attack with multiple attackers
using a slow hash function. This provided insight as to how long it took to crack each
password in more granular detail so we could further normalize the selected passwords,
which is explained further in Section 3.1.3 below.
1.2.2 Big 5 Personality Traits
Modern day personality research is commonly grounded in the work of McCrae [49] and
Costa [19], and widely used in psychological research today. Developed in part as an revi-
sion to the seminal work by Cattell [12–15], who developed a relatively complex taxonomy
of individual differences that consisted of 16 primary factors and 8 second-order factors,
the strength of Costa and McCrae’s Big-5 Personality Characteristics is its stability, con-
sistency over the lifespan, and ability to predict important psychological and behavioral
variables across a wide range of contexts and situations. Moreover, contemporary research
suggests that each of the Big-5 characteristics appear to be universal (across countries and
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cultures), and may have unique grounding in distinct biological underpinnings, further sug-
gesting that they measure real, important, predictive personality features [48]. However,
repeated attempts by researchers to replicate his work were unsuccessful [24, 68, 69] and,
in each case, researchers found that a 5-factor model accounted for data quite well.
This model was investigated further in four studies [7, 28, 33, 52]. Borgatta’s findings
are noteworthy because he obtained five stable factors across five methods of data gath-
ering. Norman’s work is especially significant because his labels (Extroversion, Neuroti-
cism, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, and Intellect) are used commonly in the literature
and have been referred to, subsequently, as “Norman’s Big Five” or simply as the “Big
Five” [2]. Borgatta deemed the fifth dimension as Intellect or Intellectence, which fur-
ther changed to Openness as the fifth dimension instead, explained in more detail below.
Openness is the chosen adoption for this study.
In the past 2 decades, the views of many personality psychologists have converged
regarding the structure and concepts of personality. Although there are many personality
tests that gauge several aspects of one’s personality, they all root back to observing the
Big-five personality traits. The 5-factor model was thus selected for this study as it helps
discretize personalities on a quantifiable spectrum. Another common scale, the Myers-
Briggs [59], observed 16 different indicators, which were too many discrete options for
the purposes of this research. The goal was to find similarities between core, overarching
dimensions of personalities.
The five personality indicators in Big-5 are as follows:
1. Extroversion relates to one’s degree of outgoingness, particularly in social situ-
ations. High levels of Extroversion are characterized by excitability, sociability,
talkativeness, assertiveness and high amounts of emotional expressiveness. People
who are high in Extroversion tend to be outgoing and gain energy from social inter-
actions. People who are low in Extroversion (i.e., more introverted) tend to be more
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reserved and insulated.
2. Agreeableness relates to one’s level of cooperativeness and concern for others. It re-
lates to attributes such as trust, altruism (selflessness), kindness, affection as well as
other pro-social characteristics (e.g., helping others). People who are high in Agree-
ableness tend to be more cooperative, while those with lower scores tend to be more
competitive, more manipulative and more aggressive.
3. Conscientiousness relates to one’s goal-directedness, thoughtfulness, and impulse
control. Individuals high in Conscientiousness tend to be more organized, more re-
sponsible, and more mindful of details. Individuals low in Conscientiousness tend to
be less rule-oriented and more irresponsible.
4. Neuroticism relates to one’s level of emotional stability. High levels of Neuroticism
are characterized by sadness, moodiness, and emotional instability. Those with low
Neuroticism tend to be more emotionally stable and emotionally resilient.
5. Openness relates to one’s ability to see connections between divergent concepts,
and willingness to consider other perspectives. Individuals high in Openness tend
to be imaginative and insightful, with a broad range of interests. Individuals low in
Openness tend to be more traditional and may struggle with abstract thinking.
These traits appear to be universal as evident from studies across countries and cultures.
Based on these studies, psychologists now believe that the five personality dimensions are
not only universal, they may also have biological origins [48].
1.2.3 Mini-IPIP Personality Test
Investigators often want to measure a wide range of constructs in research; however, com-
pleting a large packet of questionnaires can be a boring or irritating task for participants.
This might end up producing transient measurement errors (e.g., [61]) because participants
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are in a negative mood, or because they respond carelessly due to frustration with the length
of the assessment. Moreover, to the extent that it is even mildly unpleasant to participate in
research, long questionnaires may increase the likelihood that participants will decide not
to complete the study, will drop out of subsequent data collections in longitudinal studies,
or will refuse to partake in future studies entirely [22]. As a web-based application, the ex-
periment we conducted was intended to be as short and concise as possible. The motivation
to investigate another test yielded the Mini-IPIP (International Personality Item Pool).
To evaluate the Big 5 personality indicators, we asked participants to complete the Mini-
IPIP, which is a well-validated, 20-item short form of the 50-item IPIP [30]. The Mini-IPIP
has been shown to be psychometrically stable, practically useful, and with stable test-retest
reliability across studies that spanned from days to several months. The Mini-IPIP scales




Personality is an important determinator of one’s general behaviours and habits, and may
provide insight into one’s trustworthiness, as well as one’s impulses and goals [7,24,33,52,
69]. Personality also influences how we interact with others, both inside and outside our
immediate social circle. Discussed below, personality also has a major influence on one’s
interaction with digital security.
2.1 Personality
Common convergence in research has brought current personality traits to the Big 5 per-
sonality indicators - Openness, Conscientiousness, Extroversion, Agreeableness and Neu-
roticism. However, this does not explain the intricate behaviours associated with each trait.
Openness, also commonly referred to as “Openness to Experience” has become at-
tributed to the likelihood of obtaining a leadership position, likely due to the ability to
entertain new ideas and think outside the box [47]. Douglas et al. [23] also noted that
“Openness is also connected to universalism values, which include promoting peace and
tolerance and seeing all people as equally deserving of justice and equality.” This individ-
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ual traits are especially valued in positions of higher status. Schretlen et al. [62] notes that
Openness is also linked to knowledge and skills and due to exposure to new experiences,
is one of the only traits that is less likely to change over time - rather would lead to gains
in knowledge and skills. Some smaller traits encompassed by Openness include creativity,
originality and a negative correlation to conservative political attitudes [64]. Openness is
weakly related to Neuroticism and Extroversion, and is mostly unrelated to Agreeableness
and Conscientiousness [53]. Openness is often deemed as the trait least likely to change
over time, and perhaps most likely to help an individual grow. Openness is a trait that was
highly considered in our research for cases where participants have been exposed to pass-
word creation in the past, due to the collection of experiences, knowledge and skills open
people demonstrate.
Considered a stricter trait, Conscientiousness is highly attributed valuing order, duty,
achievement, self-discipline and consciously practicing deliberation [56]. Though Open-
ness is thought to help one achieve growth, Conscientiousness helps that person view their
achievement and set their limits. Judge et al. [38] also showed Conscientiousness hav-
ing a positive correlation with intrinsic and extrinsic career success, further augmented by
Soldz and Vaillant [64] who found that Conscientiousness was also an indicator of one’s
adjustment to life’s challenges along with the maturity of one’s defensive responses. This
indicates that the more Conscientiousness an individual is, the more prepared they are to
tackle novel obstacles that come their way. Conscientiousness was found to correlate some-
what negatively with Neuroticism and somewhat positively with Agreeableness, but had no
discernible relation to the other factors [53]. Conscientious individuals tend to demonstrate
goal-based traits, sparking the potential for investigation within this trait to some degree in
our research. In a situation where a conscientious person is faced with a new scenario such
as creating a password for the first time, they may excel.
Extroversion shares very similar traits to Openness such as being a strong predictor
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of leadership. Roccas et al. [56] finds that those high in Extroversion are likely to value
achievement and stimulation, while often demonstrating traits of being assertive, active, so-
ciable, and shunning self-denial in favour of excitement and pleasure. Extroversion is also
synonymous with the unlikeliness to value tradition or conformity. This makes those who
demonstrate a higher level of Extroversion more likely to try something new and exit their
comfort zone. Soldz and Vaillant’s [64] study also reports that high Extroversion positively
correlates with high income, conservative political attitudes, early life adjustment to chal-
lenges and social relationships over a lifetime. The same long-term study also found that
Extroversion generally remained the same in people over the course of a lifetime - Extro-
verts tend to stay Extroverts and visa versa with Introverts. Extroversion was also shown to
be an excellent predictor of effective functioning and general well-being [54], positive emo-
tions [74], and overconfidence in task performance [60]. Extroversion is weakly unrelated
with Neuroticism, and weakly related to Openness [53]. Due to the high correlation with
achievement and experiences, Extroversion was considered a viable trait for investigation
in our research.
Roccas et al. [56] reported that overarching values for individuals who demonstrate a
high level of Agreeableness are benevolence, tradition and conformity, while placing less
importance on power, achievement or the pursuit of selfish pleasures. Agreeable individu-
als are more concerned with the well-being of others and less about themselves. Those high
in Agreeableness are also more likely to have positive peer and family relationships, model
gratitude and forgiveness, attain desired jobs, live long lives, experience relationship sat-
isfaction, and volunteer in their community [54]. Agreeableness is somewhat related with
Extroversion and Conscientiousness, while being somewhat unrelated with Neuroticism.
Although interesting to look into how an agreeable individual would perform in a situation
where a security incident would affect those around them more than themselves, we did not
foresee this trait having much of a correlation with our research outcomes.
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The last trait within the 5 dimensions is Neuroticism, which indicates mostly negative
traits when observed at a higher level. Judge et al. [37] found that Neuroticism relates
negatively to self-esteem, general self-efficacy and individual locus of control. People who
demonstrate a higher level of Neuroticism tend to be close minded and do not get along
well with others for the most part. Neuroticism is also highly correlated with emotional
instability and vulnerability to stress and anxiety. A long-term study done by Soldz and
Vaillant [64] concluded that Neuroticism was also negatively correlated with smoking ces-
sation and healthy adjustment to life. Neuroticism correlates somewhat negatively with
Agreeableness and Conscientiousness, in addition to a weak, negative relationship with
Extroversion and Openness [53]. Neuroticism was not considered for our research as it
requires a social and temporal aspect of research to accurately measure. It would be inter-
esting to look at how Neuroticism would affect password suggestions as a facet of this trait
is close-mindedness.
Two of the more popular measures for assessing the Big-five come from the Big-five
Inventory (BFI) and the Revised NEO Personality Inventory (NEO PI-R). These two assess-
ments gained popularity as they are the most reliable and valid measurements. Originally
proposed in 1993 by Lewis R. Goldberg [29], the BFI was created to measure not only the
five dimensions, but the 40 facets around them as well. The 44 question test has been used
extensively in psychology research and is still quite popular. The original NEO-PI was
introduced in 1985 by Paul Costa, Jr. and Robert McCrae [17], which has been revised 3
times [18,48,49] over in recent years to keep up with changing times. Originally developed
to assess three main dimensions: Neuroticism, Extroversion and Openness, the NEO-PI has
since been expanded to include a NEO Five-Factor Inventory (NEO FFI), which contains
60 items and measures just the overall domains instead of all facets. The latter of the tests is
of particular interest to this our research as we hypothesize influences from the overarching
dimensions rather than the granular facets.
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2.2 Passwords
To help develop secure systems, competition historically has been devising new ways to
attack the security of the system. At the same time, new techniques to resist the attacks are
also developed. This competition has been in integral in the development of authentication
over the years.
An underlying goal has been to provide password security at minimal inconvenience
to the users of the system. For example, those who want to run a completely open system
without passwords, or to have passwords only at the option of the individual users, are able
to do so, while those who require all of their users to have passwords gain a high degree of
security against penetration of the system by unauthorized users.
“A password system must be able not only to prevent any access to the system by unau-
thorized users (i.e., prevent them from logging in at all), but it must also prevent users who
are already logged in from doing things that they are not authorized to do. The so-called
“super-user” password on the UNIX system, for example, is especially critical because the
super-user has all sorts of permissions and has essentially unlimited access to all system
resources.” [50]
Although implemented for remote-access systems, the UNIX system was the first con-
sumer/commercial system to implement a password file containing the actual passwords of
all the users. Originally, passwords stored within the UNIX system were in plaintext. They
have since changed this to implement hashing for improved security of these passwords.
Text passwords have dominated human-computer authentication since the 1960s [79].
Although many password cracking studies have been done to support the claim that pass-
words are the sole weak point of security systems [4, 21, 50], there is still no consensus on
the actual level of security provided by passwords or even on the appropriate metric for
measuring security. Password authentication has existed for several decades and it is likely
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to remain one of the top authentication mechanisms also in the future [6, 45].
2.3 Password Security
Along with passwords come security considerations. Due to decades of competition be-
tween password attacking and prevention, resulting research has proved that with modern
technology, the difference between a weak and a strong password can be the difference
between an inherit security incident and a successful mitigation strategy.
So far, large-scale password data has arisen only from security breaches such as the
leak of 32 M passwords from gaming website RockYou in 2009 [21, 76]. Password corpo-
rations have typically been analyzed by simulating adversarial password cracking, leading
to sophisticated cracking libraries but limited understanding of the underlying distribution
of passwords.
Claude Shannon [63] defined the term entropy in information theory as “a statistical
parameter which measures in a certain sense, how much information is produced on the
average for each letter of a text in the language. If the language is translated into binary
digits (0 or 1) in the most efficient way, the entropy H is the average number of binary
digits required per letter of the original language.” While Shannon was alluding to English
text strings, the term entropy became widely used in cryptography as a measure of the
difficulty in guessing or determining a password or a key [11]. Although common security
practice is not aligned with using Shannon’s entropy to benchmark passwords, it is worth
noting as a precursor to newer methods of password strength estimations.
Estimating the entropy of a password depends on the number of options available for
each character. If a password was binary and composed only of zeros and ones chosen
randomly, there will be 2n possible values of that password, where n is the number of bits
in the password. The password, in this case, has n bits of entropy. As a general rule,
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the entropy of a randomly chosen password is calculated as nl where n is the number of
available characters, and l is the length of the password. For example, if a password was
based on the standard English keyboard, where there are 95 printable characters, the space
available for each password character is 95. The entropy of an 8 characters long password
that is randomly chosen based on a standard keyboard will be 958 ≈ 6.6 × 1015, which is
almost equivalent to 252. In this case, the password is said to have 52 bits of entropy.
Considering the aforementioned, it is a well known fact that user-chosen passwords
are somewhat predictable. There is very little literature providing a solid answer to the
following question: given a number of guesses, what is the probability that a state-of-the-
art attacker will be able to break a password. Passwords have an inherint trade-off between
usability and security: while strong passwords are hard for attackers to guess, they are on
the other hand also difficult for the user to remember, which drives a lot of the motivation
behind creating a more memorable, but weaker password. Dell’Amico et al. [21] compared
and evaluated the effectiveness of currently known password attacks using various datasets
of known passwords, including over 50,000 real passwords. It was found that with the
absence of a password policy (a set of rules designed to enhance computer security by
encouraging users to employ strong passwords and use them properly see e.g., at least 1
digit, at least 1 uppercase letter), users tend to create weaker passwords. This was observed
using a variety of password guessing techniques including dictionary attacks, mangling
using dictionaries and context free grammars, and Markov chain-based strategies. It is also
noteworthy that the password guessing techniques used in this study decreased roughly in
performance as the size of the explored password grew in length. This shows that people
tend to respond in a more security-centric fashion when provided with a sense of guidance,
whether it is linked to psychological traits remains undetermined within this study, but
would make for interesting future investigation.
Passwords are used all around the web, and with the emergence of more online services,
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the need for multiple passwords becomes more apparent. To observe the effectiveness of
current password cracking techniques, Weir et al. [76] collected passwords from several
different websites, the largest one containing over 32 million passwords, to perform one of
the largest studies of its kind to data to analyze strength in passwords. Taking a deeper dive
into password policies, Weir et al. mention that password policies can become a double
edged sword as although they seem to increase password robustness, appending “123” at
the end of insecure passwords can easily be circumvented and taken into consideration by
sophisticated password crackers. A password created as such may satisfy the requirements
of a password policy, but may also contain a similar amount of insecurity as the same
password without the digits at the end. Results concluded various findings including:
1. As password length grew, passwords became harder to crack.
2. Passwords which included an uppercase letter became significantly harder to crack.
3. Passwords which included a symbol became significantly harder to crack.
Based on the above findings, Weir et al. suggest various password policies, and sug-
gested passwords when users create new passwords (e.g., if a user types “password123”,
the system may suggest “!!pasSword123”). Although it could be seen as a security vulner-
ability to suggest passwords to users when using a website, this could be grounds for future
work to see how certain personalities respond to such suggestions. Also considering a level
of awareness around the web nowadays with authentication, seeing suggested passwords
on a website could be perceived as insecure by some users. It would be of interest to see
how something like this would play out with individual personality types; whether they
respond positively or negatively to a password suggestion.
Kelley et al. [41] took a deeper look into password policies and the influence they may
have on user created passwords. Analyzing 12,000 passwords collected under seven dif-
ferent password policies via an online study, Kelley et al. investigated how resistant pass-
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words created under different password policies were. For each password created under the
7 policies, participants were given the following scenario:
“Imagine that your main email service provider has been attacked, and your
account became compromised. You need to create a new password for your
email account, since your old password may be known by the attackers. Be-
cause of the attack, your email service provider is also changing its password
rules. Please follow the instructions below to create a new password for your
email account. We will ask you to use this password in a few days to log in
again, so it is important that you remember your new password. Please take
the steps you would normally take to remember your email password and pro-
tect this password as you normally would protect the password for your email
account. Please behave as you would if this were your real password!”
A notable observation in the above scenario is the last sentence - “Please behave as
you would if this were your real password!”, could skew some of the results. Although the
intent to replicate a real life scenario is non-trivial for accurate results, participants may
be used to creating their real passwords under different circumstances. Enforcing a new
scenario may cause distortion.
Participants were also given the respective password policy that outlines the password
they created for the activity. Findings here shed light on passwords created and their
strength when users are guided by a password policy. Although the email scenario shown
above was common to every password policy, the policy itself was unique. Results indicate
that as the policy became more strict and demanding, passwords created tended to be more
resistant against password cracking attempts. The password policy basic16, which required
participants to have at least 16 characters in their password provided the greatest security
against a powerful attacker, outperforming the more complicated comprehensive8, which
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required participants to have at least 8 characters including an uppercase and lowercase
letter, a symbol and a digit. To improve password security on the whole, Weir et al.’s [76]
research noted above might be a potential beneficiary of this research in that instead of sug-
gesting a specific password, the authentication system could provide a suggested password
policy on the fly instead. It would be of interest to observe how a participant’s reaction
varies between a suggested password and suggested policy.
2.4 Password Composition
A password’s strength comes from its constitution. Research has looked into how pass-
words throughout the web have been and which ones work best. Password composition
include anything from password length, to the number of uppercase letters used.
In addition to password strength testing, Weir et al. [76] also found some noteworthy
observations regarding common password compositions in all the leaked passwords used
in their study. Perhaps most noteworthy, the length of the password correlated positively
with the number of digits, symbols, and uppercase letters used within those passwords (i.e.,
a higher percentage of passwords were determined to have digits, symbols and uppercase
letters the higher they grew in length). 60%, 8% and 7.1% of passwords with 10+ char-
acters contained digits, symbols and uppercase letters respectively. Whereas 57.5%, 4.4%
and 6.5% of passwords with 7+ characters contained digits, symbols and uppercase letters
respectively. The length of the password was also shown to be negatively correlated with
containing only lowercase letters and digits. In general, this could imply that most people
who created longer passwords were generally more security aware when it comes to secure
passwords. Of the passwords that were more than 7+ characters in length, the majority of
the ones that contained digits (64.28%) tended to have the digits after the password (e.g.,
password123). 20.51% were only number based (e.g., 1234567), 5.95% included the digits
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before the password (e.g., 123password) and only 9.24% had digits sprinkled throughout
the password (e.g., passw0rd, pass123word, p1a2ssword). Because no results were shown
to illustrate the difference between digit composition comparison between passwords of
length 7+ and 10+, no solid reporting can be done on whether users who create password
that are 10+ characters in length are more likely to sprinkle their digits throughout the
password. It would be assumed that as the length of the password grows, users tend to
be more security aware, so they would be more inclined to sprinkling their digits within
their password. It is also worth mentioning that of the passwords that contained digits, the
most frequent string of digits were “1”, “2” and “123” with 10.98%, 2.79% and 2.29% of
passwords containing them respectively.
Further validating the findings above in Weir et al.’s [76] research, Komanduri et al. [42]
conducted a similar study on 5,000 participants. It was also found that the basic16 pass-
word policy yielded the greatest security out of all given password policies. Komanduri
et al. also tested for participant sentiment to the provided password policies. More partic-
ipants agreed or strongly agreed to the comprehensive8 policy being more beneficial to
a strong password in contrast to the basic16 policy (67% vs. 57% respectively), when in
reality, the basic16 policy provided more security. What’s of perhaps the most interest in
this study is participants overarching sentiment toward the two policies. More participants
agreed or strongly agreed to making a password for the comprehensive8 policy more an-
noying and difficult than the basic16. This implies that although uppercase letters, symbols
and digits may be beneficial to the strength of a password, creating a longer password may
not only be stronger, but easier for users. A policy which combines both could be war-
ranted, however the case for annoyance and difficulty could outweigh password strength. It
would be of interest to investigate the personality dimensions that reacted more positively
to the individual password policies. For example, more creative personality type could
enjoy the comprehensive8 policy more than basic16.
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2.5 Personality and Passwords
Passwords are at the root of online security and to investigate whether or not there were psy-
chological influences behind risky password practices, Lauren VanDam from LastPass [72]
partnered with Lab42 to interview 2,000 adults around the world about their password
habits, their beliefs and their understanding of what secure online behaviour looks like.
They found that 91% of participants know there is a risk when reusing passwords, but 61%
continue to do so. They also concluded that people tend to prioritize their financial online
accounts over retail, social media, and entertainment. The data collected through the Last-
Pass survey suggest that the theory of cognitive dissonance also applies to a user’s digital
behaviour: you know it is bad for you, but you continue to do it anyway for example, you
pick up your phone to answer an important call while driving even though it is dangerous.
These findings are of particular interest as it begins introducing social aspects of our online
interactions.
It was shown that 82% of participants knew that a combination of letters, numbers and
symbols create a stronger password, but while users understood what a secure password
looks like, they still fell short when it came to password creation. 47% of all participants
used initials, fiends or family names in their passwords, and 42% of all participants used
significant dates and numbers. 26%, 21%, 14% and 13% of participants used pet names,
birthdays, their hometown and their school name or mascot in their passwords. Although
the risks of insecure passwords are aware to the majority of users, it may not be at the
forefront of their concerns during password creation. Our research aimed to look more into
how password strength and composition may be influenced by personality dimensions. In-
terested more in the lower level of password composition (i.e., password length, number of
digits, number of letters and number of symbols), the observation of higher level password
composition demonstrated in LastPass’s research could extend to personality types. For
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example, if a specific personality trait had a higher likelihood to include dates as opposed
to family names in their password.
On top of this, LastPass also found that only 29% of consumers change their passwords
for security reasons – the number 1 reason people change their passwords is because they
forgot it. Taking into consideration forgetfulness, this sheds a specific light on the exper-
iment activities conducted within this research that depends on a participant’s answer to
“Account Hijacking”, which is solely dependent on requiring a change in password in the
past. Although the question was framed to revolve around requiring the need to change an
online account password due to a security breach, this could be interpreted ambiguously
(i.e., the participant considering a forgotten password a type of security breach). They were
also unable to find any correlation between two very different personality types and pass-
word behaviours. These personality types did not seem to impact online behaviour, but to
drive rationalizations of poor password habits.
Although not immediately related to personalities, 39% of respondents within the Last-
Pass survey mentioned that they create more secure passwords for personal accounts over
work accounts. Though most businesses make it very clear that the first line of defense
for businesses in protecting themselves from attacks is informed users, the two password
creation activities within this research are strictly declared to be for personal accounts. The
LastPass survey makes no reference to how the other 61% of respondents answered this
question, so no solid conclusions can be derived from this. Although similar, our research
is focused on identifying personality characteristics specifically the Big-five personality
characteristics (Section 1.2.2) that predict how strong of a password they will choose. The
ability to do this may help identify individuals at greatest risk for creating weak passwords,
and help identify methods for encouraging these individuals towards stronger passwords.
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2.6 Personality and Security
Halevi et al. [34] found that certain personality traits may influence security and privacy
related user-behaviours online. Participants with higher levels of Neuroticism responded
to phishing emails that touted prizes of some sort. Also, participants who scored high on
the Openness factor tended to both post more information on Facebook and have less strict
privacy settings, making them susceptible to privacy attacks. Whitty et al. [78] found that
younger people and individuals who scored high on self-monitoring (participants who were
more likely to observe and regulate their expressive behaviours) were more likely to share
their passwords.
The security of computer systems often relies upon decisions and actions of end users.
Ultimately, the final state of a computer system is up to the end user. Conducting a novel
neuroscience-based study, Neupane et al. [51] reported on measuring users’ security per-
formance and underlying neural activity with respect online security incidents. It was dis-
covered that a high degree of correlation (p = 0.0002) in brain activity within the decision-
making regions were activated when attempting to detect phishing attacks and when pre-
sented with malware warning. It was also found that a high functional connectivity among
the core regions of the brain was established while participants performed the phishing de-
tection task. The regions of the brain that were highly engaged when trying to identify a
fake website implied that participants had a more difficult time dealing with fake websites
as opposed to the real ones. The fake websites may have posed more of a challenge to
participants as they may have had to spend more time thinking about different attributes,
sometimes recalling from memory. When posed with inherit security risks, this shows that
people respond in a similar manner on a neural level. However, it does not suggest an ap-
propriate evaluation of participant performance on the experiment activities. Where neural
activity is the low level of human activity, personality can be considered higher level. Our
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research investigated this higher level.
A study done by Thorpe et al. [67] introduces a difference in graphical password cre-
ation (passwords created with a series of provided images rather than characters) when
participants are provided with the usable images in different manners. Participants were
provided with 72 passwords in a grid fashion, but with a curtain in front of them before
allowing them to select. In the case where the curtain drew from left the right (i.e., showing
images on the left first), participants tended to select images on the left of the grid in more
situations for a part of their passwords rather than images on the left. In the case where
the curtain drew right to left (i.e., showing images on the right first), the opposite was true.
Participants were also restricted from selecting images for their passwords until the curtain
was fully drawn, thus alleviating the sense of urgency or time in participants selecting their
password. This presents the idea of using visual cues to help encourage strong password
creation, rather than just a policy of some sort. It seems as though Openness and Con-
scientiousness, being meticulous, calculative, collected and organized may correlate with
the outliers in this study suggesting that they may have taken more time to evaluate all the
options after the drawn curtain, rather than the familiar, first shown images.
Exposure to various online accounts with ranging levels of required security and pass-
word requirements create biases within data, which is of particular interest to this research.
A study done by Landers et al. [46] investigated 117 undergraduate students and their inter-
net usage in relation to their personality. It was found that total internet usage amongst the
participants negatively correlated with Agreeableness and Conscientiousness, along with
having a strong negative correlation with Extroversion. Being research that is primarily
rooted within the same personality scale, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, and Extrover-
sion could become specific points of interest within an online behavioural domain. This
study by Landers et al. makes no mention to Intellect and Neuroticism having any influ-
ence on internet usage amongst participants, but as any personality trait, these two affect
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the way we behave on any level. The lack of findings for Intellect and Neuroticism in this
study could be because they play little to no role on technology-related usage as observed
in Table 4.11. Of course, this is not a solid finding, but has been a repeated trend in several
findings in our research.
Usage of the web goes hand in hand with internet usage. Halevi et al. [35] investigated
the approach to cyber-security within different cultures and personalities, which points to
the suggestion that certain personality traits affect a user’s cyber-security related behaviour
when dealing with web-based forms and personal information. This falls in line with re-
search done by Gratian et al. [32], who found that characteristics such as financial risk-
taking, rational decision-making, Extroversion, and gender were found to be significant
unique predictors of good security behaviours.
2.7 Personality and Behaviour
Personality indicators such as Extroversion and Introversion can be correlated with more
abstract personal behaviours, which is especially useful for this study. A study done by Ver-
non et al. [75] found that different types of humours are correlated with the big 5 personal-
ity indicators such as affiliative (humour used to bring people together) and self-enhancing
(humour directed toward yourself, even in bad situations) humour being correlated posi-
tively with Extroversion and Openness, with a specific Openness to new experiences. Bar-
rick [2] determined that Conscientiousness showed consistent positive relations with job
proficiency, training proficiency, and personnel data all within the job performance spec-
trum. Their study also revealed that Extroversion was a valid positive predictor for training
proficiency and social interactions with managers and sales.
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2.8 Personality and Technology
With personality types playing a large factor with general and targeted internet usage, in-
vestigation between socially-directed platforms within the web and personality types have
also resulted in interesting conclusions. One study in particular done by Krämer et al. [44]
found that there was a strong correlation between levels of Extroversion and participants’
likeliness to be more experimental with their profile pictures such as choosing a photo with
a “different style” (e.g., black and white or altered colours) rather than a realistic colour pic-
ture. This is of interest as being more experimental can have a similar effect on password
creation. Extroverts being more creative may find it easier to come up with and memorize
a more complicated password.
Besides internet usage within introverts, another study conducted by Chittaranjan et
al. [16] on participants with self-reported personality traits yielded interesting results in
relation to smartphone usage. Beside further reinforcement of a strong correlation between
internet usage and Introversion, this study found that application usage, number of calls,
and number of SMS logs had a positive correlation with Introversion – further proving
that Introversion as a personality trait and its correlation to internet usage also translates to
mobile usage.
Our research aims to investigate the relationship between the Big-five dimensions of
personality and user behavior regarding digital authentication. To the best of our knowl-
edge, the Big-five personality traits (“Openness”, “Neuroticism”, “Conscientiousness”,






The tool used to collect data from a wide diversity of locations was Amazon’s Mechanical
Turk (MTurk), which is an online labour market created by Amazon to assist “requesters”
in hiring and paying “workers” for the completion of computerized tasks.
3.1.1 Infrastructure
The experiment was developed as a web application to take advantage of MTurk’s require-
ments. The web application warranted data collection in a seamless manner by sending
the required data to a database, which was stored on UOIT’s premises to abide by UOIT’s
Ethics Research Board guidelines under our approved protocol for this research. The web
server did not require a large amount of computation, so a minimal cloud-based server was
provisioned to host the website.
The web application was developed using HTML5, CSS3, JavaScript, and jQuery,
which utilized AJAX requests to send and retrieve data to and from the on-site database.
The experiment ran for roughly two hours, at which point the 500 participant set limit was
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hit. Upon completion, all data was backed up locally and to an external database. The
discrepancy between the 500 participant limit and the 517 total participants is due to the
extra experiments conducted internally as a pilot test before publishing to MTurk.
Design
We used Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) to recruit our participants. Upon clicking the
experiment URL hosted on MTurk, participants were forwarded to a web application we
designed, which consisted of several different parts: a questionnaire, password ranking test,
password scenarios, and a personality test; see Fig. 3.1. We elaborate these parts below.
Preliminary Questionnaire.
Every participant was greeted with an initial questionnaire, which consisted of several
general demographic questions. Three questions worth noting include:
• “Security Training”: Have you ever had any security training in the past? (this
includes any type of security for example, law enforcement, computer, etc.)
• “Password Awareness”: Have you ever had any password security awareness train-
ing? (e.g., learning the differences between a weaker and stronger password)
• “Account Hijacking Involvement”: Have you ever been required to change your
password as a result of an account compromise in the past?
These questions were used to segment the data in Section 4 where the results are dis-
cussed in further detail.
Password Ranking Test.
The initial test given to the participants was a password ranking test where five pass-
words were given to each participants. Every password was randomly selected from the
pool of passwords prepared for this experiment, one from each rank given by Zxcvbn; see
Section 3.1.3. Participants were asked to place each of these passwords within the follow-











Figure 3.1: Experiment Design
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was to measure the participant’s ability to identify stronger passwords from weaker ones.
Research done by Ur et al. [70] shows that participants’ perceptions of a password’s se-
curity level usually fell right in line with current password-cracking tools. To observe a
participants’ perception of given a given password’s security level, this password ranking
activity was given. No instructions about determining the differences between strong and
weak passwords were given.
Bank Scenario.
There are two scenario-based tests given to each participant – the first of which is a
bank scenario where participants were given the following dialogs. The instructions are
different only in the last sentence (password creation vs. password selection).
• “Imagine there was a breach within your main banking provider’s online banking
platform and because of this, your bank has released a notice that says all accounts
may have been compromised. Your bank strongly recommends a password change
for all accounts. Please create a new password below.”
• “Imagine there was a breach within your main banking provider’s online banking
platform and because of this, your bank has released a notice that says all accounts
may have been compromised. Your bank strongly recommends a password change
for all accounts. Please select a new password below.”
Email Scenario.
The second scenario was email-based where participants were asked the following
questions (again, the difference is between password creation vs. selection):
• Imagine your main email service provider has been attacked and that because
of the attack, your email service provider is requesting all users change their pass-
word. This is your main email account and contains very sensitive information.
Please create a password below.
Note 1: Create the most secure password you feel comfortable using and you’ll
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be able to remember.
Note 2: This password should be different from the one you created in the previous
step.
• Imagine your mainemail service provider has been attacked and that because of
the attack, your email service provider is requesting all users change their pass-
word. This is your main email account and contains very sensitive information.
Please select a new password below.
They are then required to create a new password and select a new password for their
account (the selection and creation process was intertwined within each scenario; i.e., bank
scenario select password→ bank scenario create password→ email scenario select pass-
word→ email scenario create password). Participants were given 5 different passwords to
select from in the selection scenarios, each of which were with a Zxcvbn strength estima-
tion between 0-4 to choose from. After these 4 activities, participants would have created
2 passwords and selected 2 passwords.
Two separate scenarios were given to observe whether there was a different effect on
the passwords selected/created for a participant’s banking passwords versus their email
password. This could help shed light on a personality’s heightened interest in security,
if any, depending on the scenario. Conscientious individuals for example, tend to have
a stronger grasp on finances and direction. Extroverted individuals tend to enjoy a more
social setting, perhaps implying that more Conscientious individuals could put a higher
value on their banking account security, rather than a social email password.
The password selection activities were included alongside the creation activities to ex-
amine whether participants tended to select and create similarly-strong passwords. The
limitations of the experiment from including these activities are discussed in Section 5.2.1.
Personality Test.
The last test given to participants was a short 20 question personality test based on the
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Mini-IPIP Big-five personality indicator test discussed in Section 3.1.1. Every question in
this test had the following options for an answer:
1. Very Inaccurate
2. Inaccurate
3. Neither Inaccurate or Accurate
4. Accurate
5. Very Accurate
The 20-question test is provided in Appendix A.1.5. Upon completion of this test, each
participant’s personality type is determined within the 5 personality indicator domains.
The scale of Extroversion among participants is depicted in Figure 3.2.
3.1.2 Amazon’s Mechanical Turk
Tasks on Amazon’s MTurk (e.g., transcribing text) are typically completed within minutes
and usually pay in cents rather than dollars [26]. Although payment is an important factor,
self-reports indicate that workers are driven by both extrinsic and intrinsic motives (e.g.,
workers have reported that they complete tasks “to make basic ends meet” and because
“tasks are fun” [55]), suggesting that the rewards of working on MTurk are not merely
monetary.
MTurk has a growing presence in the psychological literature as a source of research
participants, and researchers in some fields, such as human computation, have examined
work experiences on MTurk. We apply knowledge from long-term in-person work re-
lationships traditionally studied in industrial-organizational (I-O) psychology to the very
short-term online work experiences of crowdsourcing [8]. This has given MTurk a huge
degree of presence and validity within recent studies.
Although in person samples have long been a reliable source of data collection, recent
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Figure 3.2: Extroversion/Introversion in Participants
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evidence suggests that collecting data via the Internet, although far from perfect, can reduce
the biases found in traditional samples [31]. Buhrmester M. et al. [10] conducted a study
in 2011 to examine how MTurk samples compare with the diversity of standard Internet
samples. 3,066 participants from over 50 countries around the world yielded a very de-
mographically diverse distribution of people from around the world with varying cultures
and backgrounds. This was found to be significantly more diverse than typical American
college samples.
Participants were recruited from several English speaking countries including The United
States, Canada, UK, and Australia. This increased the chance that all participants were flu-
ent in English to understand the questions and scenarios within the experiment.
Demographics.
Demographic analysis was done on the 510 participants which remained after the data
filtration step discussed in Section 3.2. More than 140 participants were over the age of
40. The majority of participants was distributed normally between the ages of 20 and
40. Out of all the participants, 55.5% were male and 44.5% were female. Roughly
10% of all the participants were left handed. Although the slight majority of partici-
pants answered to an occupation within “Business, Executive, Management, and Financial”
(15.6%), “Computer Science and IT-Related” (14.5%), “Education, Training, and Library”
(11.4%), and “Healthcare Support” (6.8%) occupations, more than 160 of the total partici-
pants responded to being in “Other” (33.5%) occupations.
The “Password Awareness” question was answered at almost a 50% rate between “yes”
and “no”. 70.2% of participants answered “no” to the “Security Training” question, whereas
69.8% of participants answered “yes” to the “Account Hijacking” question.
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3.1.3 Passwords
All data used for the analysis portion of this work has been generated from the experi-
ment through the several activities as described in Section 3.1.1. For the password ranking
and password selection activities, real passwords were used (password origins discussed
below).
The passwords used within this experiment were drawn from the 2012 LinkedIn pass-
word leak where 6.5 million passwords were exposed [40]. Out of these, a random subset
of 22,000 passwords were taken and brute force attacked to recover the true plaintext pass-
words. The tool used for this is called Uniqpass, which includes over six billion entries
within a rainbow table used to brute force hashed passwords. These passwords were then
ranked by Zxcvbn (strength between zero and four).
To streamline the types of passwords that were provided to participants during the ac-
tivities, several filtration steps were taken:
• 50 passwords were randomly taken from every rank.
• Passwords that were not in “English” were discarded.
◦ Note: Many passwords with rank four in Zxcvbn mostly consist of numbers
and letters, in seeming meaningless order; we deem those as non-English.
• Only passwords that fit the criteria in Table 3.1 were taken from every rank.
Passwords used by the LinkedIn leak in this research seemed to be composed of words
from various dialects such as English and Spanish. To ensure only English-based passwords
were provided to participants, each password was manually checked. The reasoning behind
this was to involve only English speaking countries through MTurk’s settings and thus only
English based passwords.
By the end of this filtration, we had 98 passwords in total between all the ranks. All of
the resulting passwords which ranked 0-3 from Zxcvbn were comprised of English words
and numbers, whereas the selected passwords ranked 4 consisted of numbers and letters in
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Rank Slow hash time* Composition
0 < 1 second 8–12 letters
1 1–5 seconds 7–8 letters, 0–1 digit
2 1–60 minutes 7–8 letters, 0–1 digit
3 5 hours – 5 days 4–8 letters, 2–4 digits
4 5 months – 5 years 8–10 letters, 2–5 digits
Table 3.1: Selected Password Guidelines
* “Slow hash time” is the simulated time it takes the Zxcvbn algorithm to crack a




The data captured within this experiment came in a variety of numeric and textual format.
Pre-processing was required to clean and convert the data to ensure it was usable in the
analysis phase. The following section explains this process along with results found in
correspondence with our hypotheses.
Data pre-processing can often have a significant impact on the generalization of data,
especially for algorithms used for analysis on the data. Usually the removed instances of
noise have excessively deviating instances that have too many null feature values. These
excessively deviating features are also referred to as outliers. Out-of-range data is the most
difficult problem to detect. This is for cases in which the data for particular parameters
does not contain a meaningful value (e.g., personality dimension with 0%).
Due to the concise nature of the required data for this experiment, much data pre-
processing was not required, with the exception of noisy and unfinished responses.
We used a few questions for sanity-check of participants’ responses. Some participants
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also decided to exit the experiment before finishing. This left holes in the entire data for
certain records, which could not be used. Based on this filtration, we discarded responses
from seven participants. In the end, we kept responses from 510 participants. We discuss
the filtration and data pre-processing steps below.
The symbolic, logical learning statistical algorithms used to perform analysis on most
data are able to process symbolic, categorical data only. However, real-world problems
such as the one that exists in this research involve both symbolic and numerical features.
Therefore, there is an important issue to discretize numerical (continuous) features [43].
Moreover, in real-world data, the representation of data often uses too many features. but
only a few of them may be related to the target concept. There may be redundancy, where
certain features are correlated, which drives the motivation to create some new features
from existing data for analysis purposes. A few of these features including “Ranked Score
Distance”, “Ranked Score +/-”, and “Average Score” are discussed below.
Due to the complex nature of the data, various sub-objects and arrays were nested to
handle the variety of data types for the experiment activities in JSON format. The resulting
data was broken into several files, which represented the required activity-individual data
in a tabular fashion as seen in Fig. 3.3.
These files were then filtered through, and every list of strings were converted to re-
spected integers (e.g., “Yes” became 1 and “No” became 0). This was done on every
string-related answer apart from the participants’ justifications. For cases where the an-
swers spanned more than just Yes/No, respective integers were assigned (e.g., “Not very
likely”, “Somewhat likely”, “Likely”, and “Very likely” would become 0, 1, 2, and 3 re-
spectively). This process is called One-hot encoding and is required for data analysis soft-
ware and is largely used in machine learning applications.
Two valuable metrics were introduced to score how each participant performed on the
password ranking activity. Although the analysis was done on each individual bucket within
36
Figure 3.3: Data Pre-processing from document to tables.
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the activity, we wanted to have a metric to measure overall performance.
The “Ranked Score Distance” can be somewhat confusing due the inverse nature of the
scoring (i.e., the higher the score, the poorer the participant performed). In the rest of this
research, a higher score implies a stronger password. To ensure consistency, another metric
was created to capture overall participant performance called “Ranked Score +/-”. Every
participant started with a “Ranked Score +/-” of 0 and for every password that was placed
in the wrong bucket, the participant lost a point. For every password that was placed in the
right position, the participant gained a point. This means that the lowest a participant could
have received with this score is -5 and the highest is 5.
An “Average Score” metric was also created and worth noting as an average of the
four passwords created and selected (i.e., two passwords from the bank and email creation
scenarios and two passwords from the bank and email selection scenarios). The average
was taken of all four strengths assigned to these passwords from the Zxcvbn password
strength meter. Although analysis was completed using this metric as a potential criterion,
no significant findings were made. This is discussed more in Section 4
Data pre-processing took a somewhat different approach for the password character-
istics analysis. Feature engineering was done to create new fields for the email and bank
scenarios. All the created and selected passwords (four in total per participant - two for the
email scenarios and two for the bank scenarios) were taken, and 4 new fields were derived
from each created email password - “Number of characters”, “Number of letters”, “Number
of digits”, and “Number of symbols”. The “Number of symbols” field was excluded from
analysis for the selected email and bank passwords; we exclude symbols in the passwords





The collected data was brought together as a result of the 6 main activities explained in
Section 3.1.1. We took all the data and broke the analysis portion into 3 major groups for
primary analysis discussed below.
4.1.1 Data analysis on password strength
Analysis on the dataset was done on IBM’s SPSS [65]. After pre-processing the data,
individual files were fed into the software and a bivariate Pearson correlation analysis test
was run on the data of interest. As we were conducting this on two variables at a time, the
bivariate test was required. r refers to the correlation strength, p is the significance, and N
is the sample size.
The analysis for our primary results was split into three main sections:
1. Created Passwords
• Analysis on created email password scenario
• Analysis on created bank password scenario
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2. Selected Passwords
• Analysis on selected email password scenario
• Analysis on selected bank password scenario
3. Ranked Passwords
• Analysis on each individual ranked password bucket.
Analysis for the exploratory results were broken down in a similar fashion, with the
addition of performing analysis on password characteristics.
Within the created and selected password scenarios, the created and selected passwords
were awarded a strength between zero and four using Zxcvbn, which was then used for
analysis purposes: for example, does the strength of participants’ passwords increase as
they become more extroverted?
The ranked passwords were treated as five individual tests (i.e., analysis for each pass-
word bucket). The analysis was done to investigate the distance between the Zxcvbn es-
timated password strength and the bucket where a given password was placed into. For
example, if a participant placed a password of real strength four into the first bucket, they
would have a very poor score. In contrast, a participant who placed a password of real
strength zero in the first bucket would have a very good score.
4.1.2 Data analysis on password characteristics
Similar to the analysis done on the password strengths, analysis for password characteristics
were done on IBM SPSS using bivariate Pearson correlation analysis.
The characteristics for the passwords were then broken into two main processes: pass-
word creation and password selection; each process was further divided into two parts:
email and bank scenarios. The user-created passwords had four attributes: “Length of
password”, “Number of Digits”, “Number of Characters” and “Number of Symbols”. The
“Number of Symbols” field was excluded for selected passwords, as we did not provide
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any password with symbols.
4.2 Results
Results for all the test which yielded significant correlations are split into two sections
below. Primary Results are results which correspond with the aforementioned hypotheses
for this research. Exploratory Results are results worth mentioning that did not necessarily
align with the hypotheses, but are still significant.
4.2.1 Primary Results
For the email password creation scenario, we found a significant correlation between Extro-
version and password strength (r = 0.184, p < 0.05), but only when participants answered
“No” to “Account Hijacking” (i.e., whether participants were required to change an online
account password in the past). In contrast, when participants answered “Yes” to this ques-
tion, there was a mild, but non-significant, negative correlation between Extroversion and
password strength; see Table 4.1. Correlations remained very similar (albeit less strong/sig-
nificant) with the corresponding bank password scenario; see Table 4.2.
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Table 4.1: Email password creation with no account hijacking: Correlation between pass-
word created in the email scenario when participants answered “No” to “Account Hijack-
ing”, N = 154. * = significant with p < 0.05.






Table 4.2: Email password creation with past account hijacking: Correlation between pass-
word created in the email scenario when participants answered “Yes” to “Account Hijack-
ing”, N = 356.
For the email password selection scenario, we found a significant correlation between
Extroversion and password strength (r = 0.116, p < 0.001) for all cases; see Table 4.3. This
indicates that when all participants are tasked with creating or selecting a new password
for their online email account, participants who are more extroverted created and selected
stronger passwords, with a stronger correlation existing for the created email password.
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This could be indicative of the creativity trait of Extroverts coming in to play, but would
also fall out of line with the expectation that a similar result would exist in the bank creation
scenario, which was inconclusive; see Table 4.4.






Table 4.3: Email password selection: Correlation between password selected in the email
scenario for all participants, N = 510. ** = significant with p < 0.01.






Table 4.4: Email password selection with no account hijacking: Correlation between pass-
word selected in the email scenario when participants answered “No” to “Account Hijack-
ing”, N = 154. * = significant with p < 0.05.
Findings from the bank scenarios are reported in Appendix A.1.1.
43






Table 4.5: Password Ranking on the “Very Weak” bucket: Correlation between password
placed in the “Very Weak” bucket in the password ranking activity when participants an-
swered “Yes” to “Account Hijacking”, N = 356. * = significant with p < 0.05.
Note that, for brevity, we omit the tables without any significant correlation.
It is worth noting that results from the password ranking analysis were inconclusive
with very little correlation between the real and ranked score as given by Zxcvbn and the
participants respectively. One finding worth mentioning is discussed in the exploratory
results section below.
4.2.2 Exploratory Results
Due to the diverse nature of the data collected, several exploratory analyses were also
undertaken. Findings reported in this section do not qualify as primary results (as they were
not directly related to our specific hypotheses), and do not necessarily pass the Bonferroni
Correction test (explored more in Section 5.2). Nevertheless, we discuss these findings to
assess their relevance for future research directions.
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Password Strength
Password Creation and Selection. Within the bank password creation activity, when
participants responded “No” to “Security Training” and “Password Awareness”, there was a
significant negative correlation between Agreeableness and password strength (r = -0.171,
p < 0.01, N = 229).
Within the bank password selection activity, when participants responded “No” to “Se-
curity Training”, there was a significant positive correlation (r = 0.104, p < 0.05, N = 358)
between Extroversion and password strength.
To summarize, when participants answered “No”, to “Security Training” or in other
words - when participants have never had any sort of formal security training in the past,
those high in Agreeableness tended to create weaker passwords in the bank creation sce-
nario. When participants answered “No” to both the “Security Training” and “Password
Awareness” questions or in other words - when participants have never had any sort of for-
mal security training or password strength awareness training of any sort, those higher in
Extroversion tended to select stronger passwords in the bank selection scenario.
“Password Awareness” was also analyzed, but no significant findings could be con-
cluded.
Password Ranking. For password ranking, a significant positive correlation was found
between Openness and the ability to rank the weakest provided password correctly (r =
0.083, p = 0.03, N = 510). This implies, those who displayed more Openness tended to
rank the weakest given password correctly. Analysis on the rest of the buckets yielded no
significant results, but is included in Appendix A.1.2.
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Password Characteristics
Password Length. Within the bank password selection and creation scenarios, it was
found that Extroversion was significantly correlated with creating shorter passwords (i.e.,
passwords with a lower number of total characters) when participants answered “No” to
“Account Hijacking” (r = -0.180, p = 0.025, N = 154 and r = -0.241, p = 0.003, N = 154
for the bank password creation and selection scenarios respectively). Additionally, there
was a significant correlation between Extroversion and creating passwords with less letters
in the bank password creation scenario. This means that as extroverts tend to create shorter
passwords comprised of less letters as opposed to numbers and symbols (see Tables 4.6 &
4.7).






Table 4.6: Bank Creation Password Length
Correlation between the password created in the bank scenario and the length of the
password when participants answered “no” to “Account Hijacking”. N = 154. * =
significant with p < 0.05.
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Table 4.7: Bank Selection Password Length
Correlation between the password selected in the bank scenario and the length of the
password when participants answered “no” to “Account Hijacking”. N = 154. ** =
significant with p < 0.01.
Number of Letters. Analyzing the bank password creation activity, between participants
who answered “No” to “Account Hijacking”, it was found that Openness was significantly
correlated with creating passwords with less letters as opposed to numbers and symbols (r
= -0.222, p = 0.006, N = 154). This means that participants who displayed a higher level
of Openness, created passwords with more numbers and symbols as opposed to a higher
number of letters (see Table 4.8).
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Table 4.8: Bank Creation Password Number of Letters
Correlation between the password created in the bank scenario and the number of letters
in the password when participants answered “no” to “Account Hijacking”. N = 154. * =
significant with p < 0.05, ** = significant with p < 0.01.
Number of Symbols. Within the password creation activities (bank and email) and when
participants answered “No” to “Account Hijacking”, it was found that Conscientiousness
was significantly correlated with creating passwords with less symbols (r = -0.310, p <
0.001, N = 154 and r = -0.189, p = 0.019, N = 154 for the bank and email scenarios
respectively). Although not thoroughly investigated, it could be assumed that these partic-
ipants who displayed a higher level of Conscientiousness tended to create passwords with
more digits and letters as opposed to a higher number of symbols (see Tables 4.9 & 4.10).
Summary of Password Characteristics Results. Demonstrated by the results shown
above, it has been observed that there is only a correlation between the base composi-
tion of passwords and certain personality dimensions when participants answered “no” to
“Account Hijacking” or in other words - when participants have never been exposed to cre-
ating a new password for an online account as a result of a security breach. It is found that
during the bank creation scenario, created passwords were shorter and generally contained
less letters as opposed to digits or symbols for participants who demonstrated higher levels
of Openness. We also found that during the email creation scenario, the passwords created
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by more Conscientious participants had less symbols as opposed to digits and letters. This
extended into the bank creation scenario where the passwords created had significantly less
symbols. It was also found that there was a very significant correlation between selecting
shorter passwords and Extroversion in the bank selection scenario.
Results reported in this section are considered as tangible outcomes due to the direction
they open for future research. However, because this portion of the research is exploratory
in nature, false discovery must be accounted for. After applying the Bonferroni correc-
tion, the only correlation that successfully passed was that of Conscientiousness and lower
number of symbols in created passwords. Requiring to adjust the new α threshold in corre-
spondence with the number of tests run (20 for exploration due to 5 personality dimensions
and 4 password characteristics), the new α threshold become 0.0025 (0.05/20). A few other
correlations came extremely close and are worth noting because the Bonferroni correction
is susceptible to Type-2 errors. Although the rest of the correlations do not pass after the
Bonferroni correction, we still choose to report them as they cannot be overlooked due to
the possibility of Type-2 errors after the correction.
All analysis ran only tested for linear correlations within the collected data. However,
it may be the case where some more interesting findings appear when accounting for poly-
nomial based correlations. Though no definite tests were conducted for this, visual outputs
from significant password characteristics findings show that there may be a possibility for
these correlations to exist (See Figures 4.2, 4.2, 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5). Although a distinct linear
correlation can be found in every visualization, a slight parabolic correlation can be seen
in Figures 4.2, 4.4 and 4.5, where average number of letters, average password length and
average number of symbols increase as Openness, Extroversion and Conscientiousness in-
crease beyond 85%. A summarization of all the noteworthy password characteristics results
explained above can be found below in Table 4.11.
49






Table 4.9: Bank Creation Number of Symbols
Correlation between the password created in the bank scenario and the number of
symbols in the password when participants answered “no” to “Account Hijacking”. N =
154. ** = significant with p < 0.01.






Table 4.10: Email Creation Number of Symbols
Correlation between the password created in the email scenario and the number of
symbols in the password when participants answered “no” to “Account Hijacking”. N =
154. * = significant with p < 0.05.
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Figure 4.1: Openness vs. Password Length (BC): Y-axis: Average length of passwords
created in the bank creation (BC) password scenario. X-axis: Amount of Openness demon-
strated by participants out of 100%. Larger circles indicate more samples at that timestep.
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Figure 4.2: Openness vs. Password # of Letters (BC): Y-axis: Average number of let-
ters used in created passwords within the bank creation (BC) password scenario. X-axis:
Amount of Openness demonstrated by participants out of 100%. Larger circles indicate
more samples at that timestep.
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Figure 4.3: Extroversion vs. Password Length (BS): Y-axis: Average length of passwords
selected in the bank selection (BS) password scenario. X-axis: Amount of Extroversion
demonstrated by participants out of 100%. Larger circles indicate more samples at that
timestep.
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Figure 4.4: Conscientiousness vs. Password # of Symbols (BC): Y-axis: Average number
of symbols used in created passwords within the bank creation (BC) password scenario.
X-axis: Amount of Conscientiousness demonstrated by participants out of 100%. Larger
circles indicate more samples at that timestep.
54



















Figure 4.5: Conscientiousness vs. Password # of Symbols (EC): Y-axis: Average number
of symbols used in created passwords within the email creation (EC) password scenario.
X-axis: Amount of Conscientiousness demonstrated by participants out of 100. Larger
circles indicate more samples at that timestep.
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Trait Password Length # of Letters # of Digits # of Symbols
Openness ↓ (BC) ↓ ↓ (BC) - -
Conscientiousness - - - ↓ (EC) ↓ ↓ (BC)
Extroversion ↓ ↓ (BS) - - -
Table 4.11: Password Characteristics Summary
Password characteristics results summarization table. All results are recorded for
participants who answered “no” to “Account Hijacking”. BC = Bank Creation Scenario,
EC = Email Creation Scenario, BS = Bank Selection Scenario. N = 154. ↓ = significant





To ensure quality of data and participants, some design choices within the experiment were
considered and are discussed within this section.
5.1.1 Data Validation
We intentionally created overlap in some of the binary questions that were asked to par-
ticipants. For example, we expected that most users who answered “Yes” to “Security
Training”, may also answer “Yes” to “Password Awareness”. It was assumed that the “Se-
curity Training” and “Password Awareness” questions would have a direct correlation in
participant responses. Upon investigation, we found a strong correlation of 0.446 (p <
0.001) between participants who answered positively to being security trained and trained
in password strength awareness.
We also expected that there may be a positive correlation between participants who an-
swered “Yes” to “Password Awareness” and their computer skills level. This hypothesis
was based on the tentative notion that participants who spend more time on the computer
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may have been required to create and/or change more online passwords. Upon investi-
gation, we found such a positive correlation (0.143 (p < 0.01)) between participants who
answered in the affirmative to being trained in password strength awareness and having a
stronger computer skill level.
5.1.2 Participant Validation
In addition to the 20-item IPIP, three additional sports-related questions were included,
to make sure that participants were not simply clicking on the same answer over and over
again to race through the test. Two of these questions asked participants what their favourite
/ least favourite sport to watch was. The last question asked participants to what degree
they enjoyed watching sports. Depending on the variance of their answers for these three
questions, they were automatically discarded from the filtered results. Three of the 513
participants were discarded from this test.
Of the remaining 510 participants, 51 reported being left handed, which falls in line
with 10% of the population. This question was given at the beginning of the test, adding
further validation that there was a random population of people, though MTurk solves
many issues in relation to bots on their platform. Collecting responses from around the
world through the MTurk platform, on top of the diversity of occupational responses (other
than roughly 33% of participants) add another level of randomness in responses.
Due to the number of countries the experiment was outsourced to, mother tongues of
the participants had to be taken into consideration. The Zxcvbn password-ranking test es-
timates password strength based on an English dictionary. This means that any passwords
given in another language may be classified as stronger than they actually are. For example,
the password “unitedstates” receives a Zxcvbn strength estimation of 0, but the correspond-
ing Spanish “estadosunidos” receives a Zxcvbn strength estimation of 4. Because of this,
we discarded all the passwords which were not in English before providing them to the
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participants in the selection and ranking activities.
5.2 Discussion
Due to the subjective nature of some of the questions posed in the preliminary questionnaire
and situational activities, there are variables that must be taken into consideration when
reflecting on the results within this work. We discuss a few of the related issues here.
Experiment Design. The experiment was designed to give a similar experience to each
participant. However, it could be observed that an earlier activity may influence the deci-
sions of participants throughout later activities. For example, a participant may be exposed
to several passwords in the password ranking activity, which they then choose to re-use in
a later password creation activity. Although this was meant to be alleviated by prompting
participants to create their own passwords, we acknowledge that some activities may have
primed participants in a certain direction. Future research looking to replicate this exper-
iment to some degree may want to consider randomizing the order of the activities in the
experiment.
We acknowledge that the randomization of activities in the experiment could have in-
troduced a level of randomness in created password results rather than a limitation of par-
ticipant priming when always shown examples of passwords first. Another option would
be to provide participants with the password ranking activity along with the scenario-based
password selection activities after the creation activities.
Questionnaire. The “Password Awareness” question in the preliminary questionnaire is
somewhat subjective in the sense that participants may answer “No” even if they know the
difference between a stronger and weaker password to some extent. The reasoning behind
this is the interpretation of “password security awareness training”. The subjectivity in
this being a formal or informal process raises consideration. For example, a participant
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may have been required to create a new password conforming to creation rules such as,
requiring 2 digits, an uppercase letter, and a symbol with a password strength meter in
the past. The participant may not consider this as any sort of password training, however
this process indirectly teaches a participant the difference between a weaker and stronger
password.
Both email scenarios given to participants within the password selection and creation
activities included an excerpt, “This is your main email account and contains very sensi-
tive information.” Some participants may not actually use their email as a personal account
to store sensitive information, hence these participants may not be able to relate to this sce-
nario as strongly as intended.
Within both the email and bank scenarios, participants were instructed not to use the
same password for both instances. The reasoning behind this was to ensure participants
were treating both situations as two completely different accounts; but we acknowledge
that even mentioning this could have the possibility to skew data in an unauthentic fashion.
Although it is understood that we may have primed the participant to some degree and put
them on the spot, what we gained from doing this was a more diverse dataset and possibly
varying levels of strength within the two created passwords.
Password Ranking Activity. The “Ranked Score Distance” and “Ranked Score +/-” met-
rics that were developed for the password ranking activities came with a couple caveats. As
mentioned earlier in the paper, the “Ranked Score Distance” is confusing as it contradicts
the Zxcvbn philosophy of ranking stronger passwords with higher numbers. This could be
alleviated by taking the inverse of the calculated “Ranked Score Distance” (i.e., exponenti-
ating by -1), but this is becomes an exponential function with an asymptote at 0 - failing to
capture the larger penalty for bigger errors. For example, a “Ranked Score Distance” of 8
would become 1/8, whereas a “Ranked Score Distance” of 4 would become 1/4. Before be-
ing inversed, the first score would be twice as poor as the second, but after being inversed,
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it is only worse by 25%.
In this research, the “Ranked Score Distance” becomes larger, the worse a participant
performed. The “Ranked Score +/-”, although alleviating the flaw of the “Ranked Score
Distance” fails to capture the magnitude of how poorly a participant performed as every
wrong answer is only penalized with a deduction of 1. For example, if participant A placed
a password with an estimated Zxcvbn strength of 2 into the “Very Weak” bucket and placed
another password with an estimated Zxcvbn strength of 3 into the “Weak” bucket, they will
receive a “Ranked Score Distance” of 4 (2 - 0 + 3 - 1). If participant B placed a password
with an estimated Zxcvbn strength of 2 into the “Weak” bucket and placed another pass-
word with an estimated Zxcvbn strength of 3 into the “Normal” bucket, they will receive
a “Ranked Score Distance” of 2 (2 - 1 + 3 - 2), which depicts a poorer performance than
participant B. In contrast, both participants would receive an identical “Ranked Score +/-”
of -2 for getting both passwords wrong.
In regards to selecting an appropriate metric for the “Ranked Score”, mean square er-
ror (MSE) was also a viable candidate, but did not add any additional benefits compared
to “Ranked Score Distance”. MSE also do not capture the plus-minus scale, which was
desired as explained above.
We looked into the utilization of both of the aforementioned metrics (“Ranked Score
Distance” and “Ranked Score +/-”), but neither resulted in a significant correlation. A
Pearson correlation was calculated on the two metrics and resulted in an r of 0.933 and p
< 0.0001, indicating both metrics are almost identical.
Password Selection.
Our experiment included a password selection task right before password creation (i.e.,
a bank password selection before the bank password creation and the email password selec-
tion before the email password creation), where participants were greeted with 5 varying
levels of passwords to select from, each of which have different strengths of security as
61
ranked by Zxcvbn. We acknowledge that this might have had a priming effect in partici-
pants. Nevertheless, such priming would have been consistent across all of the participants,
making us believe that it would not have altered the correlations between password char-
acteristics and personality traits. Further studies are needed to confirm our belief. Jeske et
al. [36] concludes that “nudges can effectively and significantly change behavior” and al-
though this was not confirmed in our experiment, we expected the varying levels of secure
passwords in the selection phases would not have influenced the created password in the
following creation phases. Though not exactly the same as, Ur et al. [71] reported that a
combination of visual and text feedback was the most effective intervention in the design
of password strength meters. No textual or visual feedback was given to participants after
the selection activities. Furthermore, Jeske et al. [36] found that when Wi-Fi networks had
the same colored font, while not being ordered by security, no influences on participant se-
lection was observed. Passwords given to participants in the password selection activities
were presented in a similar fashion (i.e., white font, grey background, random ordering).
Findings: Password Strength. Considering the anticipated analysis on password char-
acteristics, the lack of inclusion of password policies for the password creation activities
(bank and email) was of importance. Not having password policies telling participants to
have a minimum number of characters, which included at least one letter, one digit, and one
symbol for example allowed participants to freely create a password. Although almost all
email providers and online bank sites implement some sort of password policy, the intent
behind not having one was to treat the situation as generically as possible, since password
policies differ significantly between sites. This also allowed us to perform the password
characteristics analysis without much restriction.
To ensure an inadvertent cross-correlation was not observed in our tests, a point-biserial
correlation analysis was run on the data between “Account Hijacking” and password strength
score on all 4 scenarios (email creation, email selection, bank creation and bank selection).
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It was found that no significant correlations between “Account Hijacking” and password
score was present; see Table 5.1.
Activity r (corr.) p (sig.)
Bank Selection -0.056 0.208
Bank Creation -0.068 0.126
Email Selection 0.036 0.421
Email Selection 0.015 0.733
Table 5.1: Account Hijacking VS. Password Strength
Correlation analysis between password strength and “Account Hijacking” done with a
point-biserial consideration.
Findings: Password Characteristics. Perhaps one of the most interesting portions of this
research, the several correlations between Extroversion, Openness and Conscientiousness
with password characteristics, have proposed very intriguing conclusions. We note that this
portion of the research was only conducted on four (length, number of letters, number of
digits and number of symbols) very low-level attributes that contribute to the make up of a
password. This cannot be correlated with the strength of said passwords; i.e., it cannot be
said that just because two participants include 5 digits and 5 symbols in their passwords,
it can be assumed that they are of equal strength. For example, if participant A creates a
password 1h3b2n7k5l and participant B creates a password abcde12345, their password
strengths are vastly different. Using Zxcvbn as a benchmark for calculating the strength
of these passwords, although both passwords are constructed in a very similar structure by
means of our password characteristics analysis, participant A’s password would receive a
strength of 4 and participant B’s would receive a strength of 0.
Findings discussed in Section 4.2.2 show that Openness correlated negatively with
length and number of letters in created passwords. All participants in this correlation
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were ones who responded “No” to “Account Hijacking”, implying they have never been
required to change an online account password in the past due to a security breach. It could
be worth discussing that those participants may have used their higher level of outer expe-
rience and knowledge to create a more diverse password (letters, numbers and symbols),
but without paying much attention to the length of the password. Openness also correlates
positively with creativity and originality, perhaps further justifying the creation a diverse,
creative password as opposed to a longer one. No correlation was found between password
length and number of letters used when participants answered “Yes” to “Account Hijack-
ing”, which implies that participants who have a higher level of Openness seem to learn
that a longer password with more letters also contributes to a stronger password.
Although solid evidence to several correlations were obtained, more substantial re-
search in this field would be beneficial. Conducting this experiment yielded promising
results in correspondence with the initial hypotheses. However, a couple points need to be
taken into consideration such as multiple comparisons and false discovery rate.
To account for multiple comparisons and false discovery rate, the Bonferroni correction
was run through the primary results, and all of them passed. However, the exploratory
results were not strong enough to pass the Bonferroni correction – more work is necessary
in this area to solidify confidence. It is also worth noting that these correlations are not
indications of predictor variables. Although there is a strong correlation in the observed
findings, it does not say that certain personality types are predictors of password strength,
rather just a correlate.
In the study done on 117 undergraduate students by Landers et al. [46], it was mentioned
that participants who displayed a lower level of Extroversion were strongly correlated with
spending more time on the internet. This then begs the question: is it that introverts use
weaker passwords for practicality, given that they seem to spend more time on the internet?
This observation should be taken into consideration for future work.
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Privacy Concerns. The nature of this research may give rise to a number of privacy con-
cerns. With any sort of data collection, comes potential security risks and concerns. If
companies choose to observe personalities of employees to help company security, that
personality-based data would have to be considered as sensitive employee information
and thus, handled correctly with adherence to appropriate laws and regulations. If online
companies plan on collecting user personalities, it could create another barrier for users
whereby they might find the sign-up process tedious and unnecessary. Some may even find
it invasive in terms of required personal data. Concerns as viable as these must be addressed
transparently and its intent should be made completely aware to users upon sign-up.
Future Applications. With further research, the results found in this research can help
introduce not only proactive security measures, but reactive ones as well. A proactive
application could be the augmentation of password policies and password meters to have a
more personalized feel. The tendency to satisfy a password policy for the sake of creating
an acceptable password often causes fatigue in users. User frustration can also spawn
from not achieving a desirable score on a password meter with the reluctance to adopt a
suggested password. When creating passwords, a web browser which is aware of a user’s
personality may be able to make more intelligent suggestions such as, “Try creating a
password with your dog’s name, the year it was born, followed by the first letter of 4 of
your most loved ones.” This could in turn, be more memorable, secure and acceptable than
using “P@$$w0rd” instead of “password”.
On top of companies and organizations employing a larger focus on employee per-
sonality types to further understand relative security behaviours, understanding password
security tendencies within people could help the movement toward reactive measures to
administer appropriate security training and awareness. Although Neuroticism and Agree-
ableness can very well play a role in digital authentication, it seems as though Extroversion,
Conscientiousness and Openness are more immediate correlates, perhaps opening the door
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to further, more specific research into these domains.
Observing that there are positive and negative correlations between Extroversion and
password strength, it is very interesting that a personality trait that has been shown to be
influential mostly in social settings has an effect on password authentication. We believe
there is also the potential for more research in this field.
5.2.1 Limitations
This section is to discuss some apparent limitations in this research. All the limitations
listed here are considered for future work and should be observed carefully for further
research.
Experiment Activities.
Throughout the experiment, when participants were greeted with the creation activities,
they were told to create a password that was different from the one created in the previ-
ous creation activity. The experiment was designed this way to determine whether certain
personalities would treat their online accounts differently in terms of security. Although
this assumes participants use different passwords for all their online accounts, which is
not always the case. We acknowledge this as a limitation of our work. However, for the
requirements of our research, analyzing two different passwords per participant provided
more useful insights rather than not.
Another caveat of the second password creation scenario was requesting participants
to “create the most secure password [they] feel comfortable using and [they’ll] be able to
remember.” This then introduces the question, can users be trusted that they will really
create a memorable password? Is it appropriate to assume participants are aware of what
makes a memorable password? The motivation behind the statement in the activity was
to have participants create a password they feel comfortable using, to replicate more of
a real-life scenario. The experiment was not conducted with a follow-up experiment in
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mind, which does not help with actually verifying participants remembered the password
they created. Additionally, password memorability was not a key piece of our work. This is
another limitation of our work, whereby participants creating passwords in this experiment
may have only created a password for the sake of the experiment, rather than creating one
they may use in a real life situation.
Our research also heavily depends upon the “Account Hijacking” question where par-
ticipants were asked if they have ever had to change an online account password as a result
of a security breach. This is under the assumption that a user would have remembered the
incident had it ever occurred. If it is the case where a participant had been a part of a secu-
rity breach, but just did not know it, that does not affect the outcome of the research; we are
interested in participants who are aware of a security breach if any and as a result, are more
password aware. Knowing whether participants are password aware is of particular interest
in this study as it will help determine, to some degree, the level of exposure one may have
had with password strength. This also does not cover the edge case where participants have
had to change a password in the past due to forgetfulness or other natural causes. If one
answered “Yes” to “Account Hijacking” when never being involved in a security breach,
but rather because they changed a password in the past due to forgetfulness, it could have a
very minor influence on results, however very unlikely.
5.3 Conclusion and Future Work
Personality traits have shown consistent relationships with a wide variety of human atti-
tudes and behaviours, including humour preference, goal-setting and motivation. More-
over, these correlations span across a variety of technology-relevant behaviours as well,
such as internet usage and social media usage. Our research bridges the gap between the
Big-five personality traits and the strength of one’s chosen password. We also conclude that
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there is a distinct relationship between one’s personality trait and the way they construct
their password, with room for future expansion.
Our findings identified several important discoveries. Extroversion correlated positively
with password strength, but only when the participant had not previously been required to
change an online account password before. This confirms our first hypothesis, and suggests
that there may be an important relationship between one’s level of Extroversion, and their
reaction to previous security breaches. Although not significant, our second hypothesis also
received weaker support, as Extroversion related somewhat negatively to password strength
when the participant had previously been required to change an online account password.
This could suggest an important relationship between introverts and being more password
aware when being exposed to a security incident in the past.
An extension of our work, briefly mentioned in Section 2, would be the similarities be-
tween personality types and password policies. Password policies have been shown to in-
duce annoyance and/or increase the difficulty of password creation. A common trait within
people who demonstrate higher levels of Extroversion and Openness is creativity, while
Conscientiousness and Openness are linked to achievement. Creativity and achievement
are both factors needed to conform to password policies and successfully create a pass-
word. It would be within reason to hypothesize that these three dimensions would have
an effect on user’s interactions with password policies. It also stands to reason that Con-
scientiousness would be highly correlated with responding positively to password policies
and finding them useful as Conscientious individuals tend to seek out a sense of security.
Creating a similar experiment to the one we have conducted with the addition of varying
password policies per password creation activity would be a good fit for future work to test
the previously mentioned.
Additional exploratory analyses indicated that Openness was positively correlated with
the ability to distinguish between stronger and weaker passwords, when a user has been
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required to change an online account password in the past (i.e., answering “Yes” to “Ac-
count Hijacking”). It was also observed that when a participant has to change an online
account password for the first time, Extroversion is directly correlated with creating and
selecting shorter passwords, Openness is directly correlated with creating passwords with
fewer letters and more numbers and symbols, and Conscientiousness is directly correlated
with creating passwords with fewer symbols.
The size of the current study was substantial at 510 participants; moreover, we tested
password strength in several diverse ways. Nonetheless, future research could gain addi-
tional reliability by making use of a larger sample, or within real-world systems such as,
web browsers which can collect a user’s personality type, save it, then suggest passwords
as required. Interesting future work in this category can include passively collecting data
about a user’s password habits when not in a test environment; observing how they con-
struct passwords in a variety of ways such as, time it takes to create a password, how often
they modify their password before confirming it and how many letters, digits and sym-
bols they use when provided with a password policy versus without. This will help shed
light on how certain personality traits react to passwords on different levels such as time,
decisiveness, and conformity to password strength standards.
Another interesting addition to this work would be the investigation of more abstract
password characteristics and their correlation to individual personality types; for example,
whether users with a certain personality type are more likely to use a string of digits or a
string of characters as their password. Our research looked into password characteristics
from a low level only taking into consideration the number of characters, digits, letters,
and symbols as opposed to a higher level observation such as the inclusion of whole words
within the password. This would be a good indication as to how users create, select, and re-
spond to passwords, and may help facilitate more secure and memorable passwords. Weir
et al. [76] found varying types of strings and digits used within the password study they con-
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ducted. VanDam et al. [72] from LastPass also reported findings denoting a large amount
of participants using initials, friends, family names, significant dates, numbers, pet names,
birthdays, their hometown and even their school name or mascot in created passwords.
Using this information, a similar study could be conducted to observe created passwords
and whether there is a tendency for a specific personality trait to create a password with
significant constructs.
From a predictive standpoint, using all the data collected, it is of interest to observe
whether or not some sort of predictive algorithm can be put in place to identify one’s pass-
word strength profile based on their personality and previous experiences with passwords.
Being able to determine how weak or strong one may create a password can help warn that
person before they create a password on a site if needed, as a preventative measure.
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A.1 More Exploratory Analysis
The following tables include all of the findings within the exploration portion of the re-
search. All the findings displayed here are not presented in the paper as they either do not
pass the Bonferroni correction test, are not hypothesized, or are just not significant enough
to add.
A.1.1 Statistically Significant before Bonferroni
The significant correlations here became non-significant after the Bonferroni correction.
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Table A.1: Created Email Password Strength
r p N
Neuroticism -0.019 0.767 252
Openness -0.031 0.628 252
Conscientiousness 0.004 0.945 252
Agreeableness -0.134* 0.033 252
Extroversion -0.043 0.494 252
Correlations between the password created during the email password creation activity
for participants who responded “no” to “Password Awareness”.
Table A.2: Created Email Password Strength
r p N
Neuroticism -0.024 0.648 358
Openness -0.033 0.535 358
Conscientiousness 0.052 0.331 358
Agreeableness -0.12* 0.023 358
Extroversion -0.007 0.891 358
Correlations between the password created during the email password creation activity
for participants who responded “no” to “Security Training”.
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Table A.3: Selected Email Password Strength
r p N
Neuroticism -0.029 0.586 358
Openness 0.014 0.786 358
Conscientiousness 0.081 0.125 358
Agreeableness 0 0.999 358
Extroversion 0.104* 0.05 358
Correlations between the password selected during the email password selection activity
for participants who responded “no” to “Security Training”.
Table A.4: Created Bank Password Strength
r p N
Neuroticism -0.081 0.319 154
Openness -0.018 0.822 154
Conscientiousness 0.035 0.671 154
Agreeableness -0.029 0.725 154
Extroversion 0.151 0.061 154
Correlations between the password selected during the email password creation activity
for participants who responded “no” to “Account Hijacking”.
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Table A.5: Created Bank Password Strength
r p N
Neuroticism 0.072 0.175 356
Openness -0.057 0.284 356
Conscientiousness -0.037 0.486 356
Agreeableness 0.003 0.957 356
Extroversion -0.079 0.136 356
Correlations between the password selected during the email password creation activity
for participants who responded “yes” to “Account Hijacking”.
Table A.6: “Very Weak” passwords in Password Ranking
r p N
Neuroticism -0.031 0.243 510
Openness -0.083* 0.03 510
Conscientiousness -0.049 0.132 510
Agreeableness -0.033 0.229 510
Extroversion 0.024 0.292 510
Correlations between the true Zxcvbn estimated password strength and the implied
strength of passwords placed in the first bucket within the Password Ranking activity.
Negative correlations indicate a better performance (i.e., less of a distance between the
Zxcvbn estimated strength and implied strength).
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Table A.7: “Ranked Score Distance” in Password Ranking
r p N
Neuroticism -0.041 0.288 185
Openness -0.157* 0.017 185
Conscientiousness -0.088 0.117 185
Agreeableness -0.005 0.474 185
Extroversion 0.112 0.065 185
Correlations between the “Ranked Score Distance” metric during the password ranking
activity for participants who responded “yes” to ‘Password Awareness” and “Account
Hijacking”. Negative correlations indicate a better performance as the lower the “Ranked
Score Distance”, the better a participant performed on the activity.
A.1.2 Password Ranking Activity
The correlations in this section depict performance amongst individual buckets within the
Password Ranking activity (i.e., how each personality trait performed on the “Very Weak”,
“Weak”, “Normal”, “Strong”, and “Very Strong” buckets).
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Table A.8: “Very Weak” Bucket
r p N
Openness -0.023 0.601 510
Neuroticism -0.029 0.519 510
Conscientiousness -0.104* 0.019 510
Agreeableness 0.054 0.226 510
Extroversion -0.004 0.936 510
Correlation between password placed in “Very Weak” bucket in the password ranking
activity for all participants
Table A.9: “Weak” Bucket
r p N
Openness -0.035 0.427 510
Neuroticism -0.031 0.489 510
Conscientiousness 0.092* 0.037 510
Agreeableness -0.021 0.634 510
Extroversion -0.030 0.495 510
Correlation between password placed in “Weak” bucket in the password ranking activity
for all participants
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Table A.10: “Normal” Bucket
r p N
Openness 0.031 0.489 510
Neuroticism -0.016 0.724 510
Conscientiousness -0.017 0.695 510
Agreeableness -0.027 0.541 510
Extroversion 0.007 0.873 510
Correlation between password placed in “Normal” bucket in the password ranking
activity for all participants
Table A.11: “Strong” Bucket
r p N
Openness 0.039 0.381 510
Neuroticism -0.016 0.711 510
Conscientiousness -0.002 0.972 510
Agreeableness 0.013 0.763 510
Extroversion 0.026 0.557 510
Correlation between password placed in “Strong” bucket in the password ranking activity
for all participants
87
Table A.12: “Very Strong” Bucket
r p N
Openness -0.002 0.961 510
Neuroticism 0.035 0.423 510
Conscientiousness 0.039 0.382 510
Agreeableness -0.023 0.609 510
Extroversion 0.010 0.828 510
Correlation between password placed in “Very Strong” bucket in the password ranking
activity for all participants
A.1.3 Passwords
The following tables include all the passwords used within the experiment.
Table A.13: Passwords used of Zxcvbn-strength 0
november angelica spiderman cristian
september courtney christopher internet
december precious slipknot garfield
kimberly veronica rockstar qwertyuiop
pictures sebastian christine jordan23
midnight nicholas
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Table A.14: Passwords used of Zxcvbn-strength 1
sexylady catarina playboy69 honeypie
drpepper superman1 mongoose felicidade
simpleplan happiness losangeles fantasia
lovehurts godisgood princess01 tigger12
peterpan beautiful1 ladybird ihateyou1
love4ever kittykat heavenly timberland
thuglife madison1 fernandes quiksilver
aquarius kayleigh isabella1 babycakes
soccer17 candy123 softball12 cardinals
slamdunk squirrel revolution mississippi
Table A.15: Passwords used of Zxcvbn-strength 2
ilovedave lilmomma babygirl7 beachbabe
iloveandy bootylicious scotland1 punkista
spoiled1 highschoolmusical loverboy1 pinkstar
fashionista cowgirl1 maryjane1
Table A.16: Passwords used of Zxcvbn-strength 3
2fast2furious promo2006 johnterry26 im2cute4u
lilwayne2 myhusband1 jiggaman1 ipodnano1
boomboom1 kamikaze1
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Figure A.2: Handedness Count
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Figure A.5: “Security Training” Count
A.1.5 Mini-IPIP Personality Test
The following questions were used as a part of the administered personality test for partic-
ipants.
1. “I am the life of the party”,
2. “I sympathize with others’ feelings”,
3. “I get chores done right away”,
4. “I have frequent mood swings”,
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5. “I have a vivid imagination”,
6. “I don’t talk a lot”,
7. “I am not interested in other people’s problems”,
8. “I often forget to put things back in their proper place”,
9. “I am relaxed most of the time”,
10. “I am not interested in abstract ideas”,
11. “I talk to a lot of different people at parties”,
12. “I feel others’ emotions”,
13. “I like order”,
14. “I get upset easily”,
15. “I have difficulty understanding abstract ideas”,
16. “I keep in the background”,
17. “I am not really interested in others”,
18. “I make a mess of things”,
19. “I seldom feel blue”,
20. “I do not have a good imagination”.
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